

УДК 321.01+168.522

“Soft Power” and “Smart Power” of Modern China

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Received 21.09.2013, received in revised form 18.10.2013, accepted 22.12.2013

The researcher shows that modern China is actively developing a whole set of humanitarian technologies. For this it integrates the best world conceptions and practices with its own rich and very old social-and-cultural practice. The best Chinese intellectuals are working at the technologies of strategic thinking, public relations, mass-media, public diplomacy, lobbyism, mass events organization, etc. At the same time much attention is given to “soft power”. The country’s leaders and analysts realize that preservation of integrity and the effective state’s foreign activity require the concord of “soft” and “hard” powers, giving rise to “smart power”.

Keywords: “soft power”, “smart power”, China, humanitarian technologies, molïe, public diplomacy.

According to E. Shostrom, a psychologist, “it’s amazing but in any conflict between a Hooligan and a Nice Fellow it is a Hooligan who loses”¹. At that the researcher treats “a Nice Fellow” not as an unselfish romantic but as a calculating manipulator who counts on exaggerated care, love and attentiveness². E. Shostrom probably absolutized his conclusion, paying little attention to direct physical conflicts that spring up in interpersonal as well as in intergovernmental relations. In our point of view, the importance of military force can be neither under- nor overstated. H. Kissinger believes that “almost all empires were created by force, but none of them can rely on it”³. Modern world is hardly kinder than it was centuries ago. However, as J.S. Nye (J.) argues, nowadays “power comes in many guises, and soft power is not weakness”⁴.

More than once Chinese leaders have pointed out to a great part they assign to “soft power” in the course of preservation and strengthening of the People’s Republic of China. In this regard Hu Jintao’s call “to raise the state’s cultural soft power” at the XVII congress of the Communist Party of China should be especially mentioned.

Many visitors to China wrote about Chinese élites’ primordial devotion to a “soft” style of political actions. V.I. Ivanenko who worked as a Soviet consul in the city of Hotan in southwestern Xinjiang in the years of 1940-1943 wrote in his memoirs: “In front of us there was not a wall even. It was something as amorphous, enveloping, flexible and light as Chinese silk. You pressed but there was nothing to press: everything flexed, everything backed away. But when your pressure stopped, everything took its initial shape. Cold steel masters say, and not without

reason, that it's easier to cut a blacksmith's anvil than a silk headscarf thrown in the air"⁵.

Sun Tzu wrote: "The skillful leader subdues the enemy's troops without any fighting; he captures their cities without laying siege to them; he overthrows their kingdom without lengthy operations in the field"⁶. Even "revolutionary operas" of the Maoist period paid much attention to various ruses and tricks. In 1971, pending the USA President R. Nixon's visit, "Hongqi" magazine published the article which suggested "opposing a revolutionary twofaced tactics to the enemy's counter-revolutionary twofaced tactics" and carrying on an international struggle "flexibly"⁷.

In M. Leonard's opinion, the conception of "soft power" has got a better development in modern Beijing than in Washington. This approach "implies the ability to give others the opportunity to apprehend what you would like them to". It doesn't depend on economical doles or political tricks, but mainly bases upon attractiveness of your culture and ideological views to others, upon your devotion to legal standards and your abilities to set the tone in international organizations"⁸. Liu Jianfei believes that in the future "in the course of quite a long period of time China's international responsibility will be apparent not on a material level but mainly on a spiritual one. In other words, sharing the responsibility for the state of affairs in the world, China will substantially resort not to hard power but soft power. China brought forward many approaches and ideas corresponding to common interests of peoples of the world and to the course of history. Their influence will eventually grow"⁹.

In Gao Hui's point of view, it is "China's practice in successful promotion of reforms, transparency and following its independent way of development" that can be considered to be China's soft national power"¹⁰.

N.M. Spafarii, who visited China at the end of the XVII century, mentioned its residents' special devotion to "writing and learning"¹¹. According to I. d'Hooghe, in modern world China takes the second place regarding the volume of produced scientific knowledge¹². By the year of 2004 the number of scientists had reached 926 thousand people, the number of students was 23 million people¹³. By 2020 China should become a state of an innovative type¹⁴. Not long ago Yan Xuetong, a Chinese outstanding political scientist in the sphere of international relations, stated that "if China fails to provide 80% of its youth with higher education it will not be able to catch up or excel others in technological innovations. To become an international center China has no other choice but to develop education"¹⁵. If only those domestic figures, speaking about "overproduction" of specialists with the diplomas of higher education in Russia, could hear this. Yet, it's clear that there is a difference between educations.

N.M. Spafarii also stated that the Chinese yield to the Europeans in bravery but excel them in acumen and political pragmatism¹⁶. The Celestial Empire possesses an ancient tradition of strategic thinking the peculiar features of which are thorough analysis of long-term trends, attention to psychological and political factors, scrupulous study of tactical opportunities, search for unexpected moves and impartial evaluation of decision variants¹⁷. "Shi"-concept, the art of understanding things in their development, has a great importance¹⁸.

H. Kissinger explains the difference between western and eastern types of strategic thinking dwelling upon the difference between chess and guo (Chinese: "weiqi"). In chess they play a decisive battle and the main battle is for the centre of the chess-board. Guo develops the flexibility of thinking: a player searches for a

relative advantage, strives to encircle a rival and risks to be unexpectedly encircled himself¹⁹.

In Chinese social philosophy there is the "molüe" concept. This word is roughly translated as "super-planning" that means a specific form of wisdom focusing on antagonism in its broader sense. "Molüe" implies work with various conflict situations which includes analysis and evaluation of opportunities²⁰. Thus, it is a specific humanitarian technology²¹ of preparation and making strategic decisions.

Traditional literature glorifies the strategists of the past who were able to benefit from advantageous factors, minimizing opportunities their rivals might use. Long ago, in the legendary epoch of the Three Kingdoms Shu Han actively used non-violent strokes of tactics which were supposed to undermine the enemy's fighting efficiency²². From time immemorial they valued the skill to summit talks undermining the opponent's confidence and thus gaining a psychological (if not material) superiority²³.

According to X. Liao, the process of decision-making by Chinese leaders evolved from centralized to pluralistic elitism²⁴. From December 2002 the "fourth generation" of Chinese leaders "made it a rule to hold the so called jiti xuexi (collective meetings) for the politburo members to arm the top of the elite with "progressive practice of the whole mankind" (these were Hu Jintao's words at the first meeting). By July 2004 fifteen "collective meetings" of such a kind had been held. Legal, economical, political, historical, military, technological and cultural issues were considered at these sessions. All the meetings were held by Hu Jintao. Outstanding scientists of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, leading universities and military institutes were invited to participate in the discussions. These meetings equipped supreme leaders with a wide scope of new thoughts and knowledge. They also gave the specialists of "clever tanks" the opportunity

to play the role of leaders' assistants in the formation of a new vision of certain issues of the world importance"²⁵.

The turn to humanitarian technologies of "distributed cognition" takes place on the local level as well. In the course of the experiment, conducted in the city of Tzego, small groups of citizens with the right to vote were chosen by a lot to make important and socially significant decisions. The groups of population were randomly chosen, given consultations by professional experts and then offered to vote for this or that decision²⁶.

In modern world there often occur situations which require the quickest analysis of huge volumes of information as well as taking into account various variants of numerous actors' actions in a constantly changing "battle field" for making a decision. According to N.V. Abaev, under such circumstances the ability to grasp the situation integrally in its outwardly discrepant unity and development, which was developed by Chinese Chán practitioners, may turn out to be more effective than a standard subject-object thinking limited in speed and efficiency of processing information (especially in a stressful situation)²⁷. One treatise runs: "The arrow goes up from the bow string but it doesn't fly direct to the target; the target's place is also not at the same place where it was when the calculations started. The latter turn out to be miscalculations. Thus, shooting comes to nothing"²⁸. Chán psychotherapy focuses on development of intuitive wisdom (jñāna) instead of (or, probably, in addition to) conceptual thinking limited in its potential²⁹. Integrating these practices with modern computer and info-psychological developments, China can get a unique humanitarian technology.

Dwelling upon humanitarian technologies of public relations, it should be noted that traditionally China's power was devoid of publicity³⁰. This tendency was inherited by communist China as well. For example, in

1970 Mao Zedong made only one political statement, in 1971 there were no statements at all³¹. In Maoist period a powerful but at the same time very straightforward system of mass information was developed. Its peculiar features were tough distribution of access (public mass media, military newspaper and a special bulletin for executives), idle talk, and formalism. Many events were either not mentioned or informed about with a considerable delay (for example, this or that leader's dismissal was sometimes announced years later)³². However, the events that took place on Tiananmen Square in 1989 clearly demonstrated the force of global mass media (and television, in particular) to Chinese leaders. The conclusions were drawn. Chinese thinkers speak of a discursive hegemony of West which makes such countries as China voiceless³³. Modern People's Republic of China is carrying on the policy directed towards overcoming this state of affairs. According to A.V. Shugaev, "if previously the Chinese authorities strove to protect national television against foreign influence, then now they actively involve its opportunities for the formation of favourable internal and external conditions of the country's development"³⁴. Central television has become "one of the most important instruments for the formation of the People's Republic of China's cultural identity... Its organizational structure, principles of functioning and making TV programmes, normative and legislative regulation are directed at strengthening of the Chinese nation's traditional spiritual values, search for and adoption of new strategies of the country's socio-cultural development"³⁵. Broadcasting focusing on foreign audience is also actively developing. As the Chinese authorities plan it, CCTV should grow into a global informational station capable to compete with CNN³⁶. By the way, this television station has been broadcasting in Russian since 2009³⁷.

At the beginning of 1970-ies the volume of the Xinhua News Agency's foreign-policy reports, oriented towards foreign audience, was ten thousand words a day on average³⁸. In 1997 Xinhua's number of words was approximately five hundred thousand words a day³⁹, now it's about two million. However, it's not much in comparison with the Associated Press agency with approximately seventeen million words a day⁴⁰. The country's authority would like Xinhua to work at the same quantitative and qualitative levels as the world leading agencies do⁴¹. CRI (China radio international) produces 1100 programme hours in 38 foreign languages (apart from broadcasting in Chinese dialects) a day⁴².

The journalists definitely face specific difficulties caused by ideological policy of diktat of the Communist Party of China. According to X. Zhang, contradictions between a party logic and a market one as well as between the demands for professionalism and a party line are quite often in the work of Chinese media⁴³.

Xu Angang and Zhang Xiaojun suggest working at strengthening of the main state news Internet portals as well, increasing the volume of news and the number of languages. At that it is vitally necessary to carry out structural reforms of Chinese media, contribute to their merging in large intersectoral corporations, keep up their going into the world, and provide Chinese companies, publishing newspapers and journals and establishing broadcasting companies abroad, with financial support and tax benefits. Experts believe that in a 5-10 years' period of time China could create several media corporations of a world level⁴⁴.

Millions of Chinese bloggers and Internet users are an important instrument of "soft power". A number of the English language sites broadcasting the digest of a Chinese blogging sphere is growing⁴⁵.

In China humanitarian technologies alternative to the western ones are well developed. It was in Mao Zedong's lifetime when "hospitality technologies", the art of charming foreign guests, was perfectly mastered in China. The receiving party used the arsenal typical for this purpose: excursions which were carefully thought over, the accompanying persons' psychological mastery, skillful organization of "chance meetings", delicious cuisine (in the country where an average peasant's consumption level hadn't grown since the beginning of the XX century) and subtle flattery. According to P. Kholander, "the degree of the intellectuals' susceptibility" to such frauds is "directly proportional to the degree of their alienation from their own society"⁴⁶. The representatives of the opposite subculture worry about their society's shortcoming. That's why other states' criticism is not of a great importance for them⁴⁷. The mechanism worked successfully. O. Topping, an American journalist, wrote: "I felt how China's charm is penetrating into my body and soul. The whole world was becoming new and more colourful"⁴⁸. The most significant guests were charmed by the Great Helmsman's personal image of a "king-philosopher"⁴⁹.

"Hospitality technologies" work nowadays as well. The Chinese willingly invite western intellectuals to their country, though giving priorities to luminaries in western thought but not to marginal revolutionaries as before. With the support of the Chinese leading higher education institutions the Naisbitt China Institute was founded especially for J. Naisbitt, an outstanding American futurologist. Expressing their deep gratitude to the receiving party, the Naisbitt couple enthusiastically describe dinners they were treated to by the distinguished officials of the People's Republic of China⁵⁰. The "China's Megatrends" book by John and Doris Naisbitt became the result of this project. The book is extremely informative. It contains the elements

of criticism but is complementary to the Chinese authorities (especially in "Tibet issue"⁵¹) in its general development of thoughts. The authors are certainly far from the idea that an outstanding thinker "sold himself for a mess of pottage". Everything is much more subtle here. However, the potential of "hospitality technologies" must be neither under- nor overstated.

The concept of "guan-xi" takes an important place in Chinese social reality. Its English equivalent is probably "relations". The "zou-hou-men" expression ("through the backdoor") is close to this term which means establishment of informal relations making it possible to "settle issues" within the frames of centralized hierarchical structures though unofficially but effectively⁵². The researchers state that fellow and old friendly relations were very important even in Maoist period⁵³. It was then when the skill to establish informal communications, which was traditional for China, was used for creating a new humanitarian technology. Foreign guests, the Chinese leaders were concerned with for some reason or other, were given an unofficial status of "friends". Following some conditions (for example, that of non-touching upon "three T-s" and namely the issues of Tibet, Taiwan and the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989) a foreigner keeps up "friendship" and is given honour, respect as well as material wealth. However, this status could be recalled any moment and without explaining the reasons⁵⁴. Thus, in the period of "cultural revolution" even E. Snow, the first western journalist who wrote about the communist power in China, was refused a Chinese visa⁵⁵.

Lobbyism is one of China's humanitarian technologies deeply rooted in ancient times. One of the ministers of the Han Dynasty suggested the following way of treating the Xiongnu: "Give them skillfully dressed clothes and carts to win their eyes; give them delicious food to win their

mouths; give them music and females to win their ears; provide them with magnificent buildings, storehouses and slaves to win their liver... and those who agree to obey will be honoured by the emperor who will invite them to dinner and personally serve them with wine and food, thus winning their brains. These can be called five baits⁵⁶. As H. Kissinger states, traditionally the aim of such policy was a compliant scattered periphery rather than a Chinese direct control⁵⁷.

"Guan-xi" ancient method of organization together with a scientific approach (the China's Academy of Social Sciences is focusing its studies on the processes of taking decisions in the key countries of the world) made it possible for the People's Republic of China to organize an effective system of lobbying its interests in legal and executive (and, probably, in judicial⁵⁸) authorities within the shortest period of time. A bright example of this system's successful work is blocking the initiative of W. Clinton, a President of the USA, and W. Christopher, a Secretary of State of the USA, to deprive China of the MFN (most favoured nation) status giving the possibility to trade with America on very good terms⁵⁹. The researchers state that the richest people of the USA, including B. Gates, one of the "Microsoft" founders, are in China's lobby.

R. Bernstein and R. Munro define a "new China's lobby" as a multifaceted network structure governed mainly by promises and providing with material wealth⁶⁰. In our opinion, lobbyism can't be minimized to bribery as it implies the mastery of psychological analysis as well as the technology of psychological manipulation. A skillful lobbyist develops long-term systems of relations rather than distributes envelopes with cash. The activity of "China's lobby" is, of course, not isolated. It is enriched by different methods, including PR-technologies⁶¹. According to a Hong Kong researcher, the Chinese government hires the most influential American law firms and PR-

companies. From 1997 till 2005 not less than 19 million dollars were spent on this activity⁶².

One of humanitarian technologies closely connected with the conception of "soft power" is *gongong waijiao* ("social diplomacy"). J. Wang defines it as the country's interaction and communication with foreign public in the form of a monologue, dialogue, or cooperation⁶³. According to I. d'Hooghe, the subjects of China's social diplomacy are such non-state actors as non-commercial organizations, business communities, universities, research institutes and individuals. Yet, a greater number of issues and events of public diplomacy are still initiated by public authorities (the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in particular). This partly reduces the target audience's confidence. However, certain interaction of state authority and civil society is inevitable here as public diplomacy yields no results in case it contradicts the state policy. The Chinese People's Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries (CPAFFC), Institute of Foreign Affairs (IFA) and student and youth organizations are among organizational structures working in the sphere of public diplomacy⁶⁴. In some developing countries (Ethiopia, Laos and Myanmar, in particular) volunteers from the Chinese Young People's Volunteer Army work⁶⁵.

Chinese societies abroad play a special role in public diplomacy. According to I. d'Hooghe, they act as both actors and aim of public diplomacy. They are a target group as China's authorities are eager to win Chinese diasporas, existing in many countries, over to their side. On the other hand, such diasporas enable to popularize Chinese culture and lobby the People's Republic of China's political interests⁶⁶. For example, Krasnoyarsk public organization "Chinese community" was one of the first to help those who suffered damage from the fire in Kazachinskoe village and contributed

to the organization of "Beijing – Moscow" motor race.

One of the fundamental bases of Confucianism is the "li" (ceremony, ritual) principle. According to N.V. Abaev, a ritual has been regarded as an important means of the world organization and integration of the members of society since ancient times. In one of Confucius's pupil's point of view, a ritual "leads people to concord". Music aiming at ennoblement of people, suggestion of the feelings of joy and harmony was attached a great importance in Confucian rituals⁶⁷. A very old mastery of mass holidays organization showed its worth in the course of a 4-hour long ceremony of the opening of the Olympic Games in Beijing. One of the spectators gave the following descriptions of his feelings: "Conceptually it seemed a session of mass hypnosis: a sequence of unclear charming pictures to a melodic, subordinating rhythmic music. The pictures were such that a viewer couldn't hide, abstract away from them even when in front of a TV-set"⁶⁸. According to an Internet publicist, the ceremony's conceptual base was a new life initiation; and, on the whole, the ritual can be characterized with the "Dragon is conceiving its generation" phrase⁶⁹. The image of a spiral, representing the DNA structure and life, development in general, was actively used. There was a hint of an ambitious and energetic generation of the Chinese of the XXI century⁷⁰. Three thousand "Confucians" reciting the passages from "Selected Sayings" as well as symbolic images of such Chinese inventions as paper and press were slotted in the scenario. It should be noted that in the respect of music the organizers managed to solve a most difficult task of integrating Chinese and European traditions⁷¹.

Focusing our special attention on the opening ceremony of the Olympic Games in Beijing, it is worthwhile mentioning that both this large-scale event and sport as it is are made use

of as a humanitarian technology by the Chinese authorities. It is no coincidence that the first step to establishing good relations between America and China was the American ping-pong team's trip to Beijing⁷². Humanitarian and technological potential of cinematograph is also made use of. On the 2nd of February 2012 Guan Moye, a writer and a Noble prize winner, Yao Ming, a retired Chinese professional basketball central player who played for the Houston Rockets (NBA) and the richest sportsman in China, and Jackie Chan, a famous actor, were appointed counselors of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, the supreme advisory body in the political system of China⁷³.

Modern China is actively using the charm of Confucian tradition as its "soft power". According to I. d'Hooghe, it is partly connected with the fact that the Chinese authorities treat the symbols of Chinese culture as apolitical and, thus, less potentially dangerous⁷⁴. We argue the reasons lie deeper: the Chinese authorities realize that Marxism as it is doesn't provide with the socio-cultural basis, quite strong for preserving the Chinese society's integrity. However, it is indisputable that the name and image of Confucius is used for purely technological aims.

At the beginning of 2007 there were 123 Confucius Institutes in 49 countries (12 of them functioned in Russia). They were founded in order to popularize the Chinese language and culture abroad. By 2010 the number of foreigners studying Chinese had to reach one hundred million people⁷⁵.

The experience of the Goethe-Institute in Germany and the Cervantes Institute in Spain served the examples for the Chinese. Confucius Institutes were established in many countries of the world at an unprecedented speed: in 2006 a new branch of the institute appeared every four days⁷⁶. By 2011 more than five hundred Confucius Institutes and their classrooms functioned in more

than eighty countries⁷⁷. Moreover, there was a project on translation of Confucius's Pentateuch into nine major languages in Europe and its publishing⁷⁸.

N.V. Abaev points out to Confucianism's limitedness. In his opinion, this tradition's rules aiming at suppressing egocentrism and anarchic tendencies are, on the contrary, heighten these negative traits and thus increase entropy⁷⁹. According to L.Z. Eidlin, in China's life and culture Confucianism formed a dialectic unity with Daoism being as if opposed to it⁸⁰. In connection with this it is quite appropriate to remember the conception of functional interethnic conflict developed by S.V. Lur'e. This conflict enables people to achieve their various aims and purports and thus brings necessary dynamism to culture⁸¹. The Daoists asserted: "The solid and strong dies, the soft and weak lives"⁸².

According to V.G. Nemirovskii, orientation to the world's integrity close to modern synergy is peculiar for Daoism. This tendency was also taken in by Chan imbibing many features peculiar to Daoism⁸³.

During the civil war many spiritual leaders of Chan had to leave the country. The Chan legendary Shaolin Monastery suffered from the red guards' raid. In 1970, however, it was restored⁸⁴. The present Chinese leader Xi Jinping was reported to go in for traditional martial arts and Qigong respiratory gymnastics⁸⁵. It can be supposed that today's generation of the Chinese leaders fully involves the opportunities opened by Chan in the sphere of strategic thinking.

Humanitarian and technological success of China is differently appraised by foreign and domestic observers. In J.S. Nye's (Jr.) opinion, "China hasn't cultural industry yet that can be compared to Hollywood or Bollywood; its universities yield to the American ones; this country lacks many non-commercial organizations generating soft power in the USA"⁸⁶. In his article

published in 2011 I. d'Hooghe argues that after several years of its constant growth the popularity of China in the West has recently gone down. Yet, many African countries and the countries of the Near East are still benevolent to China⁸⁷. It should be noted that modern Chinese political analysts admit that China shouldn't delude itself and rest on its laurels. True disclosure of China's humanitarian-and-technological potential requires persistent systemic work.

According to O. Borokh and A. Lomanov, "on the whole Chinese politicians proceed from the assumption that combination of soft and hard powers is needed to increase the state's "joint power". After "hard power", including economical, scientific and technical as well as military components, has reached a certain level, accumulation of "soft power" and cultural attractiveness in particular can lead to the effect of a national power "multiplier"⁸⁸.

Yang Suetun, a political scientist, notes: "Within the boundaries of Chinese Asia we followed the Wang system. Outside its boundaries we followed the line of "hegemony" in our relations with the "barbarians"⁸⁹. The political scientist suggests restoring the Wang system in today's Asia on the basis of justice and observance of the rights of Asian subjects of international law. At that, naturally enough, Yang Suetun doesn't name the countries to which the Ba system will be applied⁹⁰.

According to Zhai Decyuan, "China's defense policy is active defense"⁹¹. However, it should be noted that phraseology can be deceptive: invasion of Vietnam in 1979 was officially called a "self-defensive counter attack against Vietnam" in Chinese press⁹².

One of the issues of modern Chinese military and political analytics is "unlimited techniques of waging a war". Three main forms of such actions are distinguished. These are military actions (from an atomic bomb to terrorism), non-military

actions (diplomatic war, war in informational networks, war with the use of contraband, drugs, war to frighten) and hostile actions (financial and trade wars, war by means of influence on control systems, war with the use of media, ideological war)⁹³. According to Iu. Afanas'ev, Chinese military men are actively researching the means of psychological influence on an opponent, studying the experience of informational wars and consider it extremely important to pursue the military policy on the basis of international documents that can justify its own actions and denounce an opponent's actions⁹⁴.

Thus, modern China is actively developing a whole set of humanitarian technologies. For this it integrates the best world conceptions and practices with its own rich and very old social-and-cultural practice. The best Chinese intellectuals are working at the technologies of strategic thinking, public relations, mass-media, public diplomacy, lobbyism, mass events organization, etc. At the same time much attention is given to "soft power". The country's leaders and analysts realize that preservation of integrity and the state's foreign activity require the concord of "soft" and "hard" powers, giving rise to "smart power".

¹ Shostrom, E. Manipulatorami ne rozhdaiutsia [Man, the Manipulator]. *Kontrol' soznaniia i metody podavleniia lichnosti* (Control over consciousness and methods of a personality's suppression). Minsk, Kharvest, 2004. P. 158.

² Ibid.

³ Kissinger, H. On China. Penguin Press, 2012. P. 13.

⁴ Nye, J.S. Soft Power. The Means to Success in World Politics. NY: Public Affairs, 2004. P. x.

⁵ Ivanenko, V.I. *Tropoiu pamiati* [On the memory path]. Moscow, Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1968. P. 56.

⁶ Cit.: Kissinger H. Op. cit. P. 29.

⁷ D'erdt', I. Cherez prizmu Pekina [Through the prism of Beijing]. Moscow: Progress, 1975. P. 127.

⁸ Leonard, M. O chem dumayut v Kitae? [What does China Think?]. Moscow: AST, 2010. P. 150-151.

⁹ Borokh, O., Lomanov, A. Skromnoe obaianye Kitaya [The humble charm of China] // Pro et Contra. 2007. November-December. P. 45.

¹⁰ Cit. by: Arin, O.A. (Aliiev, R.Sh.) Rossiia: ni shagu vpered [Russia: no one step ahead]. Moscow: Exmo, 2003. P. 191.

¹¹ See: Nikolai Milesku *Spafarii. Sibir' i Kitai* [Nicolae Milesku. Siberia and China]. Kishinev, Kartia Moldaveniaske, 1960. P. 163.

¹² See: d' Hooghe, I. The Expansion of China's Public Diplomacy System // Soft Power in China. Palgrave Macmillan, 2011. P. 25.

¹³ See: Kireev, A.A. Social'no-ekonomicheskoe razvitie KNR [The Socioeconomic Development of PRC] // Sovremennyyi Kitay. Socialno-ekonomicheskoe razvitie, nacional'naya politika, ethnopsychologia [The modern China. Socioeconomic development, nationalities policy, ethnopsychology]. M.: KRASAND, 2011. P. 39.

¹⁴ See: Tzi Minian'. Stanovlenie tsennostnoi paradigmi obrazovaniia v "sociocul'turnom prostranstve" sovremennogo Kitaya [The making of value paradigm of education in "sociocultural space" of Modern China]. Synopsis of the PhD thesis. Chita, 2011. P. 3.

¹⁵ Cit.: Arin, O.A. (Aliiev, R.Sh.) Op. cit. P. 214.

¹⁶ The full quotation is the following: "The Chinese are as brave in front of Europeans as wives in front of husbands, but they excel them in acumen being resourceful inventors, sly deceivers and quick-witted at any matter. They are always ready to deceive strangers and thus show them that they excel all other peoples in acumen. They always pretend to be very ordinary and truthful to deceive others. Moreover, they are fickle; always try to get their profit. But, frankly speaking, they are incredibly hardworking" (Ibid., p. 196).

¹⁷ See: Kissinger H. Op. cit. P. 135, 188.

¹⁸ See: Ibid. P. 235.

¹⁹ See: Kissinger H. Op. cit. P. 23-25. V.G. Nemirovskii also thinks that "in the eastern type of thinking the centre is everywhere and nowhere at the same time and thus can appear anywhere, in any point. It is no coincidence that the the Daoists consider the centre to be between the sides, between the opposites: "Dao is the axis of the world". A single dao pierces through all things. It is a single way of the universe and every item individually" (Nemirovskii, V.G. *Sotsiologiia* [Sociology]. Moscow, Prospekt, 2010. P. 51.)

²⁰ Rothlin, S. Molue: Philosophical approaches to Corporate Social Responsibility as strategic wisdom. P. 6, available at: <http://www.ceibs.edu/ecclar/images/2012/03/27/637E003B3892D7FA4D0DB714BB25E10C.pdf>

²¹ Using the "humanitarian technology" term, the author bases upon P.V. Klachkov's terminological system in which "technology is a system of methods of some activity directed towards the most effective achievement of a certain result. Social technologies are those aimed at targeted influence on social structures and social processes. Humanitarian technologies are defined as a type of social technologies based on advantageous use of "soft" methods (persuasion and psychological manipulation) but not of the methods of compulsion, orders or encouragement" (Klachkov, P.V. Poniatie gumanitarnykh tekhnologii v sisteme sotsial'no-filosofskikh kategorii [The concept of humanitarian technologies in the system of socio-

- philosophic categories], *Sovremennyye problemy nauki i obrazovaniia*, 2012, No. 3, available at: www.science-education.ru/103-6452 (accessed 19 June 2012).
- 22 See: Naisbitt, J. and D. China's megatrends: the 8 pillars of a new society. NY: HarperCollins Publishers, 2010. P. 90.
- 23 See: Kissinger, H. Op. cit. P. 348.
- 24 See: Liao, X. Chinese Foreign Policy Think Tanks and China's Policy Towards Japan. Hong Kong, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2006. P. 239. It should be noted that in late Soviet epoch similar tendencies were typical for Russia as well. According to A.V. Shubin, politburo in Brezhnev's time was really a collective body. The Secretary General was rather a moderator (quite effective during the first decade of his governing) than a single leader despotically dictating his opinion on any issue (See: Shubin, A.V. *Zolotaia osen', ili Period zastoia. SSSR v 1976-1985 gg.* [Golden autumn, or Stagnation Era. The USSR in 1976-1985]. Moscow, Veche, 2008. Pp. 174-175). But this practice was supported rather intuitively, without proper theoretical thinking. As a result, nothing similar to the Chinese "system of generations" appeared in the Soviet Union.
- 25 Ibid. P. 259-260.
- 26 See: Leonard, M. Op. cit. P. 115-116.
- 27 See: Abaev, N.V. Ch'an-Buddhism i kulturno-psichologicheskie tradicii v srednevekovom Kitae [Ch'an-Buddhism and cultural-psychological traditions in medieval China]. Novosibirsk: Nauka, 1989. P. 142-147.
- 28 Cit.: Ibid. P. 143.
- 29 See: Ibid. P. 147.
- 30 See: Kissinger, H. Op. cit.
- 31 See: D'erd', I. Op. cit. P. 58.
- 32 See: D'erd', I. Op. cit. P. 17, 39, 157.
- 33 See: Hongying, Wang. Op. cit. P. 45.
- 34 Shugaev, A.V. Formirovanie kul'turnoi identichnosti kak factor globaliziruiushegosia kitaiskogo obshestva (na primere televideniia) [The formation of cultural identity as a factor of globalizing Chinese society (by the example of television)]. Synopsis of the PhD thesis. Chita, 2011. P. 21.
- 35 Ibid. P. 9.
- 36 Leonard, M. Op. cit. P. 152.
- 37 <http://russian.cntv.cn/>
- 38 See: D'erd', I. Op. cit. P. 42. Experienced readers certainly mastered the skill of "reading between the lines" to perfection.
- 39 Weber, Lai. Taiwan, China fight war of words, available at: <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2007/08/31/2003376609>
- 40 See: Hongying Wang. China's Image Projection and its Impact // *Soft Power in China*. Palgrave Macmillan, 2011. P. 44.
- 41 Leonard, M. Op. cit. P. 153.
- 42 See: Xiaoling, Zhang. China's International Broadcasting: A Case Study of CCTV International. *Soft Power in China*. Palgrave Macmillan, 2011.
- 43 See: Xiaoling, Zhang. Op. cit. P. 66-68. According to A.V. Shugaev, "In China television journalists only seem to be free while compiling their stories. Due to legal control politicians created a system when it is script writers and producers who censor everything, in fact" (Shugaev, A.V. Op. cit. Pp. 20-21).
- 44 Borokh, O., Lomanov, A. Op. cit. P. 53.
- 45 See: d'Hooghe, I. Op. cit. P. 23.
- 46 Khollander, P. *Politicheskie pilgrimy (puteshestviia zapadnykh intellektualov po Sovetskomy Soiuзу, Kitaiu i Kube 1928-1978)* [Political pilgrims (western intellectuals' travels in the Soviet Union, China, Cuba in 1928-1978)]. St.-Petersburg, Lan', 2001. P. 20.
- 47 See: Ibid. P. 42.
- 48 Cit.: Ibid. P. 415.
- 49 See: Ibid. P. 433.
- 50 See: Naisbitt J. Op. cit. P. 20.
- 51 See: Ibid. Pp. 223-225.
- 52 See: Bernstein, R., Munro, R.H. The coming conflict with China. NY, 1998. P. 111.
- 53 See: D'erd', I. Op. cit. P. 190.
- 54 See: Bernstein, R., Munro, R.H. Op. cit. Ibid. P. 113.
- 55 See: D'erd', I. Op. cit. P. 116.
- 56 Cit.: Kissinger, H. Op. cit. P. 21.
- 57 See: Ibid. P. 22.
- 58 See: Bernstein, R., Munro, R.H. Op. cit. P. 125.
- 59 See: Ibid.
- 60 See: Ibid. P. 110.
- 61 See: Ibid. P. 124.
- 62 See: Hongying, Wang. China's Image Projection and its Impact, *Soft Power in China*. Palgrave Macmillan, 2011. P. 44.
- 63 See: Wang J. Introduction: China's Search of Soft Power // *Soft Power in China*. NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011. P. 3.
- 64 See: d'Hooghe I. Op. cit. P. 19-21.
- 65 See: Ibid. P. 23.
- 66 See: d'Hooghe I. Op. cit. P. 23.
- 67 See: Abaev, N.V. Op. cit. P. 36-39.

- 68 Petrov, V.V. *Zvukovoe reshenie shou "Otkrytie Pekinskoj Olimpiady 2008 goda"* [A sound solution of the "Opening of Beijing Olympic Games 2008" show], available at: <http://referat.yabotnik.ru/iskusstvo-i-kultura/zvukovoe-reshenie-shou-otkrytie-pekinskoj-olimpiady/139527/130374/page1.html>
- 69 See: *Zagadka kitaiskoi tseremonii* [The mystery of Chinese ceremony]. Part 3, available at: <http://captain-ts.livejournal.com/8048.html>
- 70 See: *Zagadka kitaiskoi tseremonii* [The mystery of Chinese ceremony]. Part 4, available at: <http://captain-ts.livejournal.com/8951.html>
- 71 See: Petrov, V.V. Op. cit. For example, G.Ye. Grumm-Grzhimaylo, a traveler visiting China at the end of XIX century, regarded Chinese music as "a set of wild sounds without any rhythm". Grumm-Grzhimaylo, G.Ye. Op. cit. P. 178.
- 72 See: D'er'd', I. Op. cit. P. 120.
- 73 See: Dzheki Chan, Mo Ian' i Iao Min' vklucheny v sostav vysshego organa v politicheskoi sisteme Kitaia [Jackie Chan, Guan Moye and Yao Ming are allotted to the supreme advisory body in the political system of China], *ITAR-TASS*, available at: <http://www.itar-tass.com/c11/638397.html>
- 74 See: Ibid.
- 75 Leonard, M. Op. cit. P. 153.
- 76 Borokh, O., Lomanov, A. Op. cit. P. 53.
- 77 See: d'Hooghe I. Op. cit. P. 25.
- 78 See: Tsi Minian' Op. cit. P. 21.
- 79 See: Abaev, N.V. Op. cit. P. 47.
- 80 See: Ibid. P. 68.
- 81 See: Lur'e, S.V. *Istoricheskaya etnologiya* [Historical ethnology]. Moscow, Akademicheskii Proekt: Gaudeamus, 2004. P. 484.
- 82 Cit. by: Abaev, N.V. Op. cit. P. 56.
- 83 See: Nemirovskii, V.G. Op. cit. Pp. 50-51.
- 84 See: Fochkin, O. Shaolin, available at: http://vatanym.ru/?an=vs207_mm5
- 85 Kuda letit Kitaiskii Drakon [the place where Chinese dragon flies], available at: <http://newsland.com/news/detail/id/1082725/>
- 86 Nye J.S. Jr. *The Future of Power*. NY : Public Affairs, 2011. P. 178.
- 87 d'Hooghe I. Op. cit. P. 28.
- 88 See: Borokh, O., Lomanov, A. Op. cit. P. 50.
- 89 Cit.: Leonard, M. Op. cit. P. 179.
- 90 See: Ibid.
- 91 Zhai Decyuan. *Kitay: istoriya i sovremennye geopoliticheskiye vyzovy* [China: the history and the modern geopolitical challenges]. URL: <http://www.geopolitica.ru/article/kitay-istoriya-i-sovremennye-geopoliticheskiye-vyzovy>
- 92 See: Kissinger H. Op. cit. P. 368.
- 93 See: Leonard, M. Op. cit. Pp. 172-173. According to Chinese sources of information, during the siege of Albazin ostrog (the Chinese called it Ajax) "the Qin government applied the following strategic policy – "first goes a ritual, then follows a military force". The policy provided the following: "to accumulate enough military provision, to eternally guard Heilongjiang borders, to constantly suppress giving troubles to an opponent". Cit.: Popov, I.M. *Rossia i Kitay: 300 let na grani voyny* [Russia and China: 300 years on the verge of war]. Moscow, 2004. P. 121. About that tactics which implied encirclement and rapture of communications see: Ibid. P. 124.
The ability of the Chinese to a military science was differently appreciated by prehistoric authors. N.M. Przheval'skii considered the Chinese army's fighting efficiency to be extremely low. He stated soldiers' and officers' craze for opium (See: Popov, I.M. Op. cit. P. 236). Characterizing the Chinese army, B. Grombchevskii pointed out to general corruption, careless use of arms and infrequent field firing (See: Ibid. Pp. 175-176). However, in 1895 already the General N.I. Grodekov suggested in his analytical report that they shouldn't exaggerate the defiance of the Chinese to the military science which was truth on two feet then (See: Ibid. P. 182). In 1913 General A.N. Kuropatkin stated that the Chinese could make excellent soldiers due to such traits of national character as high working capacity, unpretentiousness, persistence, cruelty, strong nerves and ability to face their death in cold blood (See: Ibid. P. 451).
- 94 Afanas'eva, Iu. *Kitaiskii spetsnaz: lichnoe znakovstvo* [Chinese special mission units: personal acquaintance], available at: http://www.bratishka.ru/archiv/2009/9/2009_9_8.php

«Мягкая сила» и «умная сила» современного Китая

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Исследователь показывает, что современный Китай активно развивает целый комплекс гуманитарных технологий, совмещая лучшие мировые концепции и практики с собственным богатым и древним социально-культурным опытом. Лучшие умы КНР работают над технологиями стратегического мышления, «связей с общественностью», массмедиа, «общественной дипломатии», лоббизма, организации массовых мероприятий и т.д. Вместе с тем, уделяя большое внимание «мягкой силе», руководство и аналитики этой страны понимают, что сохранение целостности и эффективная внешняя деятельность государства требуют сочетания «мягкой» и «жесткой» сил, порождающего «умную силу».

Ключевые слова: «мягкая сила», «умная сила», гуманитарные технологии, Китай, «молюэ», общественная дипломатия.
